Brigham Young University

BYU ScholarsArchive
Faculty Publications
2008-07-01

A Satisficing Approach to Aircraft Conflict Resolution
Wynn C. Stirling
wynn_stirling@byu.edu

James K. Archibald
james_archibald@byu.edu

Nicholas A. Jepsen
Richard L. Frost
Jared C. Hill

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarsarchive.byu.edu/facpub
Part of the Electrical and Computer Engineering Commons

Original Publication Citation
Archibald, J. K., et al. "A Satisficing Approach to Aircraft Conflict Resolution." Systems, Man, and
Cybernetics, Part C: Applications and Reviews, IEEE Transactions on 38.4 (28): 51-21
BYU ScholarsArchive Citation
Stirling, Wynn C.; Archibald, James K.; Jepsen, Nicholas A.; Frost, Richard L.; and Hill, Jared C., "A
Satisficing Approach to Aircraft Conflict Resolution" (2008). Faculty Publications. 177.
https://scholarsarchive.byu.edu/facpub/177

This Peer-Reviewed Article is brought to you for free and open access by BYU ScholarsArchive. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Faculty Publications by an authorized administrator of BYU ScholarsArchive. For more
information, please contact ellen_amatangelo@byu.edu.

510

IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON SYSTEMS, MAN, AND CYBERNETICS—PART C: APPLICATIONS AND REVIEWS, VOL. 38, NO. 4, JULY 2008

A Satisﬁcing Approach to Aircraft
Conﬂict Resolution
James K. Archibald, Senior Member, IEEE, Jared C. Hill, Nicholas A. Jepsen, Wynn C. Stirling, and Richard L. Frost

Abstract—Future generations of air trafﬁc management systems
may give appropriately equipped aircraft the freedom to change
ﬂight paths in real time. This would require a conﬂict avoidance
and resolution scheme that is both decentralized and cooperative.
We describe a multiagent solution to aircraft conﬂict resolution
based on satisﬁcing game theory. A key feature of the theory is
that satisﬁcing decision makers form their preferences by taking
into consideration the preferences of others, unlike conventional
game theory that models agents that maximize self-interest metrics. This makes possible situational altruism, a sophisticated form
of unselﬁsh behavior in which the preferences of another agent
are accommodated provided that the other agent will actually take
advantage of the sacriﬁce. This approach also makes possible the
creation of groups in which every decision maker receives due
consideration. We present simulation results from a variety of scenarios in which the aircraft are limited to constant-speed headingchange maneuvers to avoid conﬂicts. We show that the satisﬁcing
approach results in behavior that is attractive both in terms of
safety and performance. The results underscore the applicability
of satisﬁcing game theory to multiagent problems in which selfinterested participants are inclined to cooperation.
Index Terms—Conﬂict resolution, decision making, distributed
control, multiagent systems, satisﬁcing games.

I. INTRODUCTION
NEFFICIENCIES in the current air trafﬁc control (ATC)
system cost the airline industry billions of dollars annually
in delays and wasted fuel [1], [2], and the burning of unnecessary fuel contributes to atmospheric pollution [3]. The desire to
reduce operational expenses has motivated investigations into
alternative ATC approaches. For example, in free ﬂight, pilots
would be allowed to modify their ﬂight path in real time [4]. As
a consequence, much of the responsibility for ensuring safety—
maintaining adequate separation between aircraft—would shift
from centralized ground control to pilots and onboard decision
support systems. Such systems would utilize navigation aids,
communication technologies, and computing infrastructure to
detect and resolve projected conﬂicts before proximity violations can occur.
This paper presents a decentralized, multiagent approach to
the resolution of conﬂicts in enroute airspace, the open airspace
between airports. This space is an attractive candidate for automation because it does not require rigid scheduling and be-
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cause aircraft density is lower than in the airspace immediately surrounding airports. As in preliminary versions of this
research [5]–[7], we assume that each aircraft is aware of critical
information (e.g., position, velocity, and destination) pertaining
to each aircraft within a given communication radius. To allow
comparison of our approach with previously published studies,
we adopt a commonly employed 2-D model of airspace in which
all aircraft ﬂy at the same altitude and at constant speed. Conﬂicts can thus be avoided only through heading-change maneuvers. While maneuvers involving velocity and altitude changes
would be critical in any complete ATC system, the difﬁculty
of maintaining aircraft separation is increased if they are excluded. Thus, for high trafﬁc densities, the model constitutes a
formidable challenge for any conﬂict resolution technique.
As reviewed in Section V, many techniques have been proposed for resolving conﬂicts between aircraft, from heuristic
path-planning algorithms to formalized optimal conﬂict resolution approaches. Although these approaches differ widely,
they all seek the “best” solution, even if it can only be approximated. Conceptually, they rank-order the set of possible actions,
and then select the action with the highest ranking, subject to
appropriate constraints. The approach described in this paper
is fundamentally different: each aircraft determines the set of
acceptable avoidance maneuvers it can perform, obtained by
eliminating from the full set of options as many bad choices as
possible, based on safety and efﬁciency concerns. The remaining alternatives are deemed to be “good enough,” or satisﬁcing.
Essentially, a satisﬁcer is a cautious optimizer who, rather than
insisting on a single “best” solution, retains an enlarged view
containing all reasonably acceptable solutions. We show that our
satisﬁcing approach compares favorably with conﬂict resolution
techniques described in the literature.
There are several reasons why a satisﬁcing decision mechanism is advantageous for distributed multiagent control in general, and aircraft conﬂict resolution in particular. First, there is
no need to posit a single deﬁnition of “best,” which, in the absence of centralized control and global knowledge, varies from
the perspective of each participant. Instead, satisﬁcing permits
agents—individual aircraft in this case—to extend their spheres
of interest beyond the self. This enables complex social behavior such as altruism, where agent A defers to agent B because
B’s immediate need is greater, even though it increases A’s personal expense. Second, satisﬁcing permits group and individual
interests to be reconciled in a single, coherent mathematical
structure. Third, it provides a constructive way for the participants to negotiate and reach an acceptable compromise. Fourth,
satisﬁcing agents are not restricted to pairwise consideration of
projected conﬂicts; many can be addressed in a single avoidance
maneuver.
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The next section describes the theoretical foundation for this
paper. Section III describes two conﬂict resolution models constructed within the satisﬁcing framework. An example conﬂict
is discussed in Section IV to illustrate the operation of the resolution techniques. Section V summarizes previously published
approaches to conﬂict resolution, and measures of system performance are discussed in Section VI. Section VII describes the
simulator used and presents simulation results from a variety of
conﬂict scenarios. Finally, Section VIII summarizes our ﬁndings
and concludes the paper.
II. THEORETICAL BACKGROUND
Any mathematical formalization of a decision problem requires two basic components. First, a concept of preference
must be deﬁned, and second, a solution concept must be applied
to identify an acceptable solution. In conventional decision theory, preferences are deﬁned via utility functions (also called cost
functions or performance indices) that rank-order the possible
choices in terms of their desirability. For single-agent decision
problems, an obvious solution concept is to maximize the utility function. For multiagent decision problems in which the
agents are exclusively self-interested, the game-theoretic Nash
equilibria is the appropriate solution concept. Unfortunately, the
Nash solution concept can lead to unduly pessimistic solutions
for agents disposed to cooperate. For example, in the prisoner’s
dilemma, the single Nash equilibrium corresponds to the players
betraying each other, but the payoffs are highest if both cooperate and remain loyal to each other. (Axelrod has addressed this
problem in detail; see [8].)
Satisﬁcing game theory [9] employs a new utility structure
and a new solution concept, both of which easily accommodate
cooperative agent communities, and are therefore, well matched
to conﬂict resolution. Before describing the application of this
new theory to ATC, we summarize the essential components of
satisﬁcing game theory.
A. Social Utility
Perhaps the most basic requirement for the formation of a coherent society from a collection of autonomous agents is some
basic guarantee of equity: no agent should be required in all situations to subjugate its own interests to beneﬁt the group. Thus,
a reasonable condition for a society of cooperatively disposed
agents is that it be socially coherent, meaning that categorical
subjugation cannot occur. As established in [10] and [11], social coherence can be assured if and only if the preferences of
a multiagent system are expressed by the mathematical syntax of multivariate probability theory. Preferences are represented using social utilities, each of which is a mass function
pG :U → [0, 1] where U represents the set of possible actions.
Social utilities must satisfy the following properties.
1) Nonnegativity: p
G (u) ≥ 0 ∀u ∈ U.
2) Normalization: u∈U pG (u) = 1.
Because social utilities are probability mass functions (but with
altogether different semantics), they inherit the properties of
conditioning, independence, and marginalization.
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A unique feature of satisﬁcing game theory is its use of dual
utilities. Each agent Xi is assumed to be composed of two
selves—a selecting self Si and a rejecting self Ri . Associated
with each Si is a social utility pS i that orders each action available to Xi in terms of its effectiveness in avoiding failure, or
conversely, in achieving success. Similarly, the social utility pR i
associated with each Ri orders each action in terms of its inefﬁciency in conserving resources. Social utilities pS i and pR i
are referred to as selectability and rejectability functions, respectively, or simply selectability and rejectability. In effect,
these represent, respectively, the beneﬁts and costs of choosing
a particular action. The individually satisﬁcing set is deﬁned as
Σi = {ui ∈ Ui : pS i (ui ) ≥ qi pR i (ui )}

(1)

where Ui is Xi ’s (ﬁnite) set of possible actions and qi is Xi ’s
negotiation index. The satisﬁcing set contains the collection
of actions for which the degree of effectiveness is at least as
great as the degree of inefﬁciency, modulated by the negotiation
index. Simply put, the beneﬁts of each action in the set outweigh
its costs. Nominally qi = 1, but its value may be reduced if
desired in the process of negotiation. The Cartesian product of
all individually satisﬁcing sets, called the satisﬁcing rectangle,
is denoted as
 = Σ1q × · · · × Σnq .

(2)

Each vector (u1 , . . . , un ) ∈  represents a collection of individual decisions that are each “good enough” for the individuals,
in the sense that failure is avoided while conserving resources.
The next issue to consider is the behavior of the group
as a whole. Let G = {X1 , X2 , . . . , Xn } be a group of n
autonomous agents. Then, the group action set is U = U1
× · · · × Un , the Cartesian product set. For any k-element
subgroup Gi = Xi 1 , . . . , Xi k , its corresponding action set is
Ui = {Ui 1 × · · · × Ui k }. As with the individuals, we associate
a social utility, the group selectability function pS 1 ,...,S n , to
characterize group-level effectiveness, and a group rejectability
function pR 1 ,...,R n to characterize group-level inefﬁciency. The
group-level satisﬁcing set is deﬁned as
ΣG ={(u1 , . . . , un ) ∈ U :
pS 1 ···S n (u1 , . . . , un ) ≥ qG pR 1 ···R n (u1 , . . . , un )}

(3)

where qG is the group negotiation index.
III. SATISFICING CONFLICT RESOLUTION
In a decentralized approach, collisions must be avoided by
the joint actions of individual aircraft, each using only local
knowledge. We assume that each aircraft is equipped with a
transponder that broadcasts information about its location and
intentions to all other aircraft within a 50-nmi radius. This information includes current position and heading, destination, ﬂight
time, and delay (relative to an unobstructed straight line ﬂight).
Using this information, each aircraft will choose an action at
each time step that considers both the positions and preferences
of other aircraft with which it could conﬂict. To maintain a high
level of accuracy, we use a time step of 1 s in our simulator.
If aircraft are unable to exchange information this frequently,
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estimated positions obtained from predictive models may be
used.
For this study, we assume that all aircraft ﬂy at the same altitude and at the same constant speed. Once each second, each
aircraft chooses one of ﬁve directional options, including ﬂying
straight, moderate turns (2.5◦ ) left or right, and sharper turns
(5◦ )) left or right. In our model, heading changes are instantaneous. Considering that the standard turn rate of conventional
aircraft is about 3◦ /s, the moderate heading change option reﬂects a gentle turn, while the sharp turn corresponds to a more
aggressive evasive action.
The ﬁrst step in applying satisﬁcing theory is to determine,
in general terms, how selectability and rejectability are to be
deﬁned for the problem of interest. (Multiple formulations are
typically possible within the satisﬁcing framework.) Since selectability reﬂects goal achievement, and since the goal of each
agent is to get to its destination, we base selectability on how
directly the resulting heading leads to the destination. We use rejectability to reﬂect safety concerns; the number and immediacy
of conﬂicts resulting from a given directional choice will determine the value of the rejectability function for that option. The
precise details of these social utility functions are explained later.
The next step is to determine what information from other
aircraft will be used in the local decision process for each agent.
Relationships between agents in the system are represented by
directed acyclic graphs depicting inﬂuence ﬂow. Because the set
of potentially conﬂicting aircraft is time varying, static inﬂuence
ﬂows cannot accurately represent the system. In our approach,
situation-speciﬁc inﬂuence ﬂows are created that cause each
agent to consider the preferred headings of aircraft with higher
rankings. Recomputed at each time step, the ranking is determined by delay, ﬂight time, and proximity to destination. Each
aircraft ﬁrst partitions the set of viewable aircraft (those within
50 nmi) into two subsets: those within 5 nmi of their destination
and all others. Aircraft in the ﬁrst set have higher rank than those
in the second set. Within each set, aircraft are ranked according
to delay, with greater delay bringing a higher rank. Finally, aircraft in the same set with the same delay are ranked according
to their current time in ﬂight, with longer ﬂight times resulting
in a higher ranking. This paper assumes that the ranking mechanism results in a unique priority for each aircraft, and that rank
orderings of conﬂicting aircraft are consistent from the point of
view of all participants.
To determine the selectability of its options at every time
step, each agent Xi creates an inﬂuence ﬂow graph, as shown in
Fig. 1, summarizing direct and indirect inﬂuences on Si , Xi ’s
selecting self. The graph includes an edge to Si from every
parent of Xi —viewable aircraft with higher ranking than Xi
that could conﬂict with Xi for some allowed heading choice.
The selecting selves of other aircraft are used because they
reﬂect heading preferences. The graph also includes all parents
of Xi ’s parents that lie within its viewable region, and Si is the
only leaf node in the graph. The set of Xi ’s parents constitute
its priority set, denoted as Pi . Members of Pi are indexed 1 to
|Pi | and only members of this set directly inﬂuence pS i . In the
scenario depicted in Fig. 1, three aircraft with higher rankings
are within Xi ’s viewable area, two of which are in conﬂict with

Fig. 1.

Example inﬂuence ﬂow graph to Determine selectability.

Xi , and hence, in its priority set with indices 1 and 2. A third
aircraft, Xj , has conﬂicts with both members of Xi ’s priority
set but not with Xi directly.
In our formulation, the rejectability function pR i reﬂects concerns for the safety of Xi . Each aircraft compares a linear extension of each of its directional options uil , l = 1, . . . , |U | with
linear projections of current headings of all aircraft in Pi . Each
projected conﬂict adds a weight to that option, depending on its
distance in time and the severity of the conﬂict: collisions are
weighted more heavily than near misses. After all higher ranking
aircrafs have been considered, the weight of each option is normalized over the option space so that a mass function is obtained.
A. Rejectability
The details of computing the rejectability social utility are as
follows. Let Rc and Rn m denote the collision radius and near
miss radius, respectively, with Rc << Rn m . Let uc represent
the current heading, d(i, k) the projected distance from Xi ’s
current position to the point of closest approach to Xk ∈ Pi ,
and dm in (i, k) the shortest distance between Xi and Xk on their
projected paths. Then

pR i (ul ) ∝
WR (Xk (uc ), Xi (ul ))
(4)
X k ∈P i

where ∝ signiﬁes proportionality. (The raw weights are ultimately normalized to create a mass function, but proportionality
is preserved.) The weighting function WR is deﬁned by
⎧
⎪
⎨ 2α, if dm in (i, k) ≤ Rc
α, if Rc < dm in (i, k) ≤ Rn m
WR (Xk (uc ), Xi (ul )) =
⎪
⎩
0, otherwise
(5)
where α is deﬁned as
⎧

β
Rn m −dm in (i, k)
1
⎪
⎪
1+
⎪
, if d(i, k) ≤ 3Rn m
⎨
Rn m
d(i, k)
α= 
β
⎪
⎪
1
⎪
⎩
,
otherwise .
d(i, k)
(6)
The parameter β is a variable that was experimentally tuned;
simulation results reported in Section VII were obtained using
β = 2/3.
The aforementioned construction increases the weight (and
thus, the rejectability) of heading options that lead to conﬂicts
or small separation from other aircraft. If conﬂicts exist in every
direction, the least rejectable option will be the one with the most
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distant conﬂicts. If no conﬂicts exist for all heading choices, pR i
is set to a uniform distribution, so subsequent agent decisions
depend only on selectability.
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Then
ρS i |S 1 ,...,S |P i | (uil |ūm ) ∝
|P i |


B. Selectability

⎧
3,
⎪
⎪
⎪
⎪
⎪
2,
⎪
⎪
⎪
⎪
⎪
2,
⎪
⎪
⎪
⎪
⎨ 1.1,
wS (ul ) =
⎪
1.1,
⎪
⎪
⎪
⎪
⎪ 1,
⎪
⎪
⎪
⎪
⎪
⎪
1.1,
⎪
⎪
⎩
1,

r(ul ) = 1

(11)

r(ul ) = 3, 2.5 < |udir − ul | ≤ 5
o

o

r(ul ) = 3, 5o < |udir − ul |
r(ul ) = 4, |udir − ul | ≤ 5o

(7)

r(ul ) = 4, 5o < |udir − ul |
r(ul ) = 5, |udir − ul | ≤ 5o
r(ul ) = 5, 5o < |udir − ul |.

WS (Xi (uil ), Xk (ukj )),

k = 1, . . . , |Pi |
(8)

where
1,

if dm in (i, k) > Rn m

0,

otherwise.

(9)

=



ρS i |S 1 ,...,S |P i | (uil |ūm ) · p̂S 1 ([um ]1 )

m =1

(12)
· p̂S 2 ([um ]2 ) · · · p̂S |P i | ([um ]|P i | )
  
=
ρS i |S 1 ,...,S |P i | (uil |u1 , ... , u|P i | )
···

Wik (ui , ukj ) = 1.

u |P i | ∈U

(13)

The computation of the marginal ρS i (uil ) uses the product of
|P |
estimated marginals Πk =i 1 p̂S k (uk ) instead of the true joint selectability pS 1 ,S 2 ,...,S |P i | (u1 , . . . , u|P i | ) because agents are limited to local information, and neither the true joint selectability
nor the true marginal selectabilities of other agents are generally
available. The estimated marginal p̂S k (uk ) for all Xk ∈ Pi is
calculated by considering the effects on Xk of all aircraft in Pk
that are within Xi ’s ﬁeld of view. The accuracy of Xi ’s model
on pS k is dependent on how many and which of Xk ’s parents are
viewable by Xi . Of course, Xi has no way of knowing to what
degree its viewable list and Pk overlap but, as a general rule,
the lower the distance from Xk to Xi , the greater the likelihood
of members of Pk being in Xi ’s viewable set. Thus, Xi ’s estimates are most accurate for the aircraft nearest—and therefore,
of most immediate concern—to itself. Note that ρS k (uk ) will be
uniform for agent Xk ∈ Pi whenever the aircraft that inﬂuence
Xk , if any, are not viewable by Xi .
Finally, the selectability mass function pS i (uil ) is formed by
the convex combination
pS i (uil ) = λσS i (uil ) + (1 − λ)ρS i (uil ),

λ ∈ [0, 1]. (14)

All aircraft for which Pi = ∅ have λ = 1. Otherwise, parameter
λ affects the relative weight given to the perceived heading
preferences of other aircraft. Our simulation results used a very
small λ (0.001) relegating σS i to the role of a tiebreaker between
otherwise equivalent options.
C. Satisﬁcing Set

Thus, all pairs of heading options that cannot conﬂict are assigned a weight of one. The columns of the matrix of weights
are then normalized such that


|U ||P i |

ρS i (uil )

· p̂S 1 (u1 ) · p̂S 2 (u2 ) · · · p̂S |P i | (u|P i | ).

r(ul ) = 2

WS (Xi (uil ), Xk (ukj )) =

The marginal selectability is computed by summing over all
possible vectors ūm according to

u 1 ∈U u 2 ∈U

Assigned weights are then normalized over Xi ’s option space
to form mass function σS i (uil ).
Despite the apparent complexity of the previous deﬁnition,
only ﬁve distinct mass functions can be constructed by this
procedure. When no other agents inﬂuence Xi , either because it
has the highest ranking or because no viewable aircraft conﬂict
with it, the selectability pS i (ui ) = σS i (ui ). Otherwise pS i (ui )
is formed as the convex combination of σS i (ui ) and another
mass function ρS i (ui ), which accounts for the inﬂuence of other
agents. ρS i (ui ) is created as follows.
For each of its parents Xk ∈ Pi , Xi calculates a matrix of
weights
=

m = 1, . . . , |U ||P i | .

k=1

In contrast with rejectability, selectability is inﬂuenced by
the preferences of other agents. The ﬁrst step in computing
selectability is assigning a rank r(ul ) to each option according
to |udir − ul |, where udir is the direct heading to the aircraft’s
destination. Ranks for the ﬁve options are assigned such that
r(ul ) is 1 for the heading option closest to udir and 5 for the
option furthest from udir . A weight wS (ul ) is then assigned as
a function of r(ul ) and the magnitude of |udir − ul |

Wik (uil , ukj )

Wik (uil , [ūm ]k ),

(10)

u i ∈U

Let ūm , m = 1, . . . , |U ||P i | be a vector of dimensionality |Pi |
representing a particular choice of heading for each of the aircraft in Pi , and let [ūm ]k be the kth element of that vector.

Once aircraft Xi has determined its selectability and rejectability, it can identify the set of satisﬁcing options. In general,
if the satisﬁcing set is not a singleton, a variety of tie-breaking
rules can be employed. For example, agents willing to tolerate
risk for high gains could maximize selectability. Risk averse
agents could choose to minimize rejectability, but this gives no
guarantee of progress toward the goal. For this application, the
satisﬁcing option is selected with the largest difference between
selectability and rejectability values, insuring the greatest
possible progress toward the goal relative to the risk incurred.
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In general, the effectiveness of a satisﬁcing solution depends
on selectability and rejectability utilities reﬂecting different aspects of the problem, yet both utilities deﬁned earlier consider
projected conﬂicts. An explanation is in order. For this application, selectability reﬂects goal achievement, or getting to the destination as directly as possible. Selectability considers the preferred direction of other aircraft so that the most effective heading will be chosen. (The concern here is that steering directly
into the preferred path of another aircraft will require additional
avoidance maneuvers in the future.) In contrast, rejectability reﬂects safety concerns, or maintaining adequate separation from
other aircraft. In the case of rejectability, we test for possible
collisions with linear projections of the current actual headings
of other aircraft, rather than with estimates of preferred headings
at the next time step. The distinction is subtle, but important.
D. Simpliﬁed Model
The computation required for selectability scales as |U ||P i | .
For current and projected aircraft densities, the priority sets are
small and the computational overhead is manageable. We have
run real-time simulations with the full computations of over 70
aircraft on a single processor. However, for some of the stylized
scenarios considered in Section VII, aircraft densities increase
signiﬁcantly (to unrealistic levels) and the computational
demand is too great for real-time execution. For this reason, we
explored an alternative approach with reduced computational
requirements that would permit real-time operation in densely
congested airspace.
As described earlier, the construction of the weighting matrices is intuitive and heuristic. Given those matrices, the construction of ρS i |S 1 ,...,S |P i | (uil |ūm ) involves a good deal of averaging,
and the ﬁnal computation of the marginal ρS i (uil ) is necessarily
approximate. These facts suggest that it should be possible to
simplify the model and reduce computation without incurring
signiﬁcant losses in performance. The simpliﬁed model we developed, which scales in complexity with |U ||U | , exploits the fact
that there are only ﬁve unique σi (uil ) mass functions. The simpler model permits real-time operation in all modeled scenarios,
and as will be shown, it performs nearly as well as the full model.
The principal simpliﬁcation comes from partitioning the priority set Pi into |U | = 5 sets S1g , . . . , S5g according to each
aircraft’s preferred heading option, as determined by the mass
function σS i . That is, all aircraft in group Slg have ul as their
most selectable option, based solely on the fact that ul leads
most directly to the destination. Let Wg (j) denote the cardinality of Sjg . As with the full model, we create a matrix of weights,
but this time there is only one matrix for each partition Slg ∈ Pi
rather than one for each aircraft Xk ∈ Pi . The matrix of weights
for the kth partition is given by

WS (Xi (uil ), Xj (ukm )).
(15)
Wik (uil , ukm ) =
X j ∈S kg

The normalization procedure is the same as that described earlier, namely

Wik (ui , ukm ) = 1.
(16)
u i ∈U

Fig. 2.

Example conﬂict.

The simpliﬁed conditional selectability is calculated as
ρS i |S 1g ,...,S 5g (uil |u1 , u2 , . . . , u5 ) ∝

5


Wg (j)Wik (uil , uk ).

k=1

(17)
The conditional ρS i |S 1g ,...,S 5g can be interpreted as the selectability of Xi conditioned on the selectability of each heading
option aggregated over each partition Sjg . In effect, each partition Slg is treated as an individual aircraft, and as there are only
|U | heading options per aircraft, there are only |U ||U | values of
the conditioning option vector u1 , . . . , u5 . At this step, the simpliﬁed model reduces the memory required more than it reduces
the computational overhead.
The marginal selectability is now calculated as
 

ρS i (ul ) =
...
ρS i |S 1g ,...,S 5g (uil |u1 , . . . , u5 )
u 1 ∈U u 2 ∈U

u 5 ∈U

· σS 1g (u1 ) · σS 2g (u2 ) . . . σS 5g (u5 ).

(18)

The computational savings relative to the full model come at this
step, and they arise from two sources. First, there is no longer any
need to compute the |Pi | marginals p̂, and second, the marginalization process is much easier because there are only |U | conditioning agents. As before, the selectability function pS i (uil ) is
formed by a convex combination of σS i (uil ) and ρS i (uil ).
IV. EXAMPLE SCENARIO
To illustrate satisﬁcing-based conﬂict resolution, consider the
two-aircraft scenario depicted in Fig. 2. The aircraft A and B
are headed directly to their destinations, points Q and P, respectively, and a collision will occur if both continue on their current
heading. (Neither the aircraft nor the ﬁve heading-change options are drawn to scale in the ﬁgure.) Assume that A and B are
10 and 5 min behind schedule, respectively.
The selectability and rejectability of A are straightforward to
compute. Because its value is reduced for options that take the
aircraft off course, pS A is the highest for the option of ﬂying
straight, somewhat lower for moderate turns either direction, and
the lowest for sharp turns in either direction. Since A has a higher
ranking because of its higher delay, it will not consider B in
computing its selectability. Similarly, because A has no conﬂicts
with higher priority aircraft, it determines that pR A is a uniform
distribution over its option space. Because it is the option for
which pS A − pR A is largest, A will choose to ﬂy straight.
B has lower priority, so it will sacriﬁce some efﬁciency to
resolve the conﬂict, and it will do so in a way that takes it the
least off course. The value of B’s selectability pS B is largest

Authorized licensed use limited to: Brigham Young University. Downloaded on February 5, 2009 at 15:25 from IEEE Xplore. Restrictions apply.

ARCHIBALD et al.: SATISFICING APPROACH TO AIRCRAFT CONFLICT RESOLUTION

for the option that leads to a conﬂict-free path—assuming A
ﬂies in its preferred direction—and that deviates least from B’s
direct path to its destination. If the distance between A and B
is sufﬁcient to avoid a conﬂict with a moderate turn, then the
two moderate turns will have the highest selectability. The two
sharp turns will have slightly lower values, while the straight
option will be assigned a near-zero value.
B’s rejectability pR B is determined by comparing directional
options with A’s actual heading. If moderate turns avoid conﬂicts, going straight will be assigned the value 1 and all other
options will have value 0. If moderate turns result in a near
miss and only sharp turns avoid conﬂicts, going straight will be
assigned the highest rejectability, slight turns will have smaller
values, and sharp turns will have a rejectability of 0. Ties are
broken by picking the option that takes the aircraft closest to its
destination. The option for which pS B − pR B is greatest will,
therefore, correspond to the smallest detour that B can take that
avoids a conﬂict with A.
Suppose now that A’s destination is actually R, and that it is
not headed directly to its destination because it is completing an
avoidance maneuver. In this case, pS A is highest for a sharp left
turn, and pR A is uniform, so A will choose the sharp left turn. In
determining pS B , A’s preference to turn left (taking the shortest
path to its destination) will be taken into consideration, and
B’s options to go straight or turn left (away from A’s anticipated
path) will be assigned higher values. Values of pR B are based on
A’s actual heading, so they are identical to the previous scenario.
Thus, B will choose a left turn, but within a small number of
(1 s) time steps, A will have changed its heading enough that
B will turn directly toward its goal, since that heading will no
longer lead to a projected conﬂict with A.
Finally, important concerns about safety can be addressed in
the context of this scenario. If both A and B produce consistent rankings and are operating normally, exactly one of them
will turn and the conﬂict will be resolved. (This avoids both the
case where neither turns, and the case where both turn, making
mirror-opposite moves in sequence and prolonging the conﬂict.)
If A and B were to obtain inconsistent rankings, an eventuality
that could be prevented in a well designed system, the lower
ranked aircraft might not defer to the other aircraft as expected.
Similar behavior would be observed if B were an instance of
a noncompliant aircraft that transmits the expected information
regarding its location and intentions but never defers to other
aircraft, simply ﬂying a direct path to its destination. While no
conﬂict resolution scheme can be effective if the participants
fail to follow a fundamental set of expectations, our satisﬁcing
approach offers a simple and natural way of dealing with the
failure of B to defer: other aircraft detect the unexpected behavior and move B to the top of their rankings. In Section VII, we
consider the impact on performance when 10% of the aircraft
in the system are noncompliant.
V. ALTERNATIVE CONFLICT RESOLUTION TECHNIQUES
Widespread interest in ATC enhancements has resulted in
the development and analysis of a variety of conﬂict-resolution
approaches. Proposed schemes differ in several important ways,
including centralized or distributed control, the actions allowed
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to avoid conﬂicts, and the feasibility of completing the required
computation in a real-time setting.
Krozel et al. describe three different conﬂict resolution algorithms, one centralized and two distributed [12], all of which are
implemented as constant-speed heading change maneuvers. The
centralized approach determines the set of conﬂicts arising in the
next 8 min if no corrective actions were taken. Aircraft are partitioned into clusters such that each pair of aircraft that conﬂict
are in the same cluster. All aircraft within a cluster are ranked
using a permutation sequence, and the highest ranking aircraft
is allowed to ﬂy its nominal trajectory. A conﬂict-free trajectory
is then sought for each remaining aircraft in sequence. If, at any
point, an acceptable conﬂict-free path cannot be found, the algorithm restarts with a different ranking and permutation sequence.
In Krozel’s decentralized approaches, aircraft resolve their
own conﬂicts as they are detected. Multiple conﬂicts within the
8-min look-ahead window are resolved in a sequential pair-wise
fashion, either passing in front of or behind the conﬂicting
aircraft. A myopic strategy selects the alternative that requires
the smallest heading change. A second look-ahead strategy
further examines the selected maneuver to ensure that it does
not produce a conﬂict that would occur earlier than the original
conﬂict. If such a conﬂict is detected, the strategy tries the
alternative maneuver, and then small heading offsets from the
original choice, if needed.
Pappas et al. propose a decentralized conﬂict architecture that
views the aircraft as a hybrid system incorporating both discrete
events and individual dynamics modeled by differential equations [13]. Projected conﬂicts are resolved in two phases. First,
noncooperative methods from game theory are used by each aircraft to search for a velocity change that guarantees separation
regardless of the actions of the opponent. If the ﬁrst phase is unsuccessful, the aircraft employs coordinated constant-velocity
heading-change maneuvers to avoid the conﬂict. Maneuvers are
described for up to three aircraft depending on the geometry
of the scenario. The noncooperative game-theoretic approach
is expanded in [14] to include both path deviations and speed
variations. Subsequent extensions have included the following:
a complete methodology for generating provably safe conﬂict
heading-change and velocity-change resolution maneuvers for
two aircraft [15], [16], a comparison of the hybrid approach relative to a continuous kinematic planner proven to be safe with
up to three aircraft [17], and a protocol for resolving conﬂicts
with instantaneous heading-change maneuvers when conﬂicting
aircraft are out of direct communication range [18].
Kosecka et al. use distributed motion planning algorithms
based on potential and vortex ﬁelds to generate prototype
heading-change maneuvers for multiaircraft conﬂicts; actual
maneuvers are ﬂyable, piece-wise linear approximations of the
prototypes which can be proven safe using hybrid veriﬁcation
techniques [19]. Selected maneuvers are shown for up to four
aircraft. This work was extended in [20] to include altitude
change maneuvers if heading changes in the horizontal plane
were unable to resolve the conﬂict.
Dugail et al. analyze a decentralized conﬂict resolution
scheme for two perpendicular ﬂows of air trafﬁc that intersect
at a ﬁxed point [21]. Upon entering the airspace, each aircraft
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makes a single instantaneous heading change—the minimum
required to avoid conﬂicts with those aircraft already present.
After the maneuver, each aircraft ﬂies in a straight line until leaving the modeled airspace. The authors prove that this conﬂict
resolution scheme does not result in arbitrarily large avoidance
maneuvers and is therefore stable. In related work [22], scenarios are examined with trafﬁc ﬂows that meet at arbitrary angles. Avoidance maneuvers include both instantaneous heading
changes and instantaneous lateral position changes.
Resmerita and coworkers describe an approach that partitions
the airspace into static cells that may be occupied by only one
aircraft at a time, thus ensuring separation [23], [24]. Conﬂict
resolution equates to ﬁnding a conﬂict-free path through a resource graph representing the cells in the airspace. The aircraft
share a common database that includes preferred ﬂight plans
for all aircraft in the system. When a new aircraft desires to
enter the system, it registers its ﬂight plans in the database and
compares its paths with those of active aircraft. If none of its
preferred paths are conﬂict free, resources are requested from
other aircraft, which are required to relinquish resources if an
alternative path to their destination exists. If resource requests
do not produce a solution, the new aircraft is not allowed to
enter the airspace.
Bicchi and Pallottino propose a method for planning optimal
conﬂict resolution maneuvers for kinematic models of aircraft
ﬂying in a horizontal plane with constant velocity and curvature
bounds [25]. The approach is formulated as an optimal control
problem to minimize total ﬂight time: necessary conditions are
derived, possible trajectories are parameterized, and solutions
are numerically computed. In this approach, the number of optimization problems grows combinatorially with the number of
aircraft involved. Both centralized and decentralized implementations are described and simulated. Similar approaches were
later applied to systems with centralized control and aircraft
maneuvers consisting of either instantaneous velocity changes
or single instantaneous heading changes [26], to a decentralized
hybrid approach with instantaneous heading changes including
up to three aircraft [27], and to a decentralized hybrid system
for an arbitrary number of nonholonomic vehicles [28].
Other authors have studied conﬂicts using probabilistic models that allow for uncertainty in aircraft position due to wind and
errors in tracking, navigation, and control. Paielli and Erzberger
describe a means for estimating the probability of a conﬂict
between two aircraft, given predicted trajectories for each [29].
Trajectory prediction errors are modeled with a normal distribution, error covariances for an aircraft pair are combined into
a single covariance of relative position, and a coordinate transformation is used that allows an analytical solution. Prandini
et al. introduce two probabilistic prediction models, one for
mid-range (tens of minutes to conﬂict) and one for short-range
(seconds or minutes to conﬂict) [30]. When a probable conﬂict
is detected, a decentralized conﬂict resolution algorithm is employed to make heading changes based on potential ﬁelds in
which aircraft repel each other. Simulation results are included
for up to eight aircraft.
Rong et al. describe a cooperative agent-based solution to
conﬂict resolution based on constraint satisfaction problems

[31]. Using direct communication, conﬂicting agents negotiate
pair-wise until a mutually acceptable resolution is found. Agents
take turns proposing solutions; if the other aircraft rejects the
proposal, it sends a revised solution accompanied by information about whatever private constraint the previous solution violated. If negotiation fails to produce an acceptable alternative,
the aircraft turn to centralized controllers for a resolution.
In an approach based on computational geometry, Chiang
et al. employ a Delaunay diagram to represent the aircraft in
ﬂight [32]. Since nearest neighbor information is encoded in the
diagram, a conﬂict alert is triggered if the length of an edge falls
below a separation threshold. The conﬂict resolution algorithm
is computationally intensive, amounting to the construction of
a nonintersecting set of piecewise linear tubes or pipes through
space–time, each of which corresponds to the trajectory of an
aircraft.
Finally, Kuchar and Yang describe a framework in which 68
previously published methods for conﬂict detection and resolution are categorized [33]. Critical factors in their taxonomy
included conﬂict resolution methods (prescribed, optimized,
force-ﬁeld, or manual), maneuvering options (speed change,
lateral, vertical, or combined), and the management of multiple
aircraft conﬂicts (pairwise or global).
VI. PERFORMANCE MEASURES
In order to compare and evaluate alternative approaches to
conﬂict resolution, appropriate metrics must be used to ensure
that both safety and performance objectives are met. A variety
of measures have been employed in previously published work.
In this section, we discuss the most promising of these and
motivate the metrics used in Section VII.
A. Separation Assurance
For any algorithm, the most important metric is that of safety,
or spatial separation of aircraft. The frequency of conﬂicts is
a function of trafﬁc density and the physical geometry of the
intersecting ﬂight paths. Surprisingly, many papers describing
algorithms for ATC and conﬂict resolution do not explicitly
report the number of near misses or collisions that occurred in
their simulation runs. In our studies, we track and report two
distinct types of separation violations: collisions, when aircraft
come within 300 ft of each other, and near misses, which occur
when aircraft are separated by less than 5 nmi.
B. System Efﬁciency
System efﬁciency measures the degree to which the aircraft
in the system are able to follow direct, linear ﬂight paths to
their destinations [12]. Conﬂict resolution maneuvers typically
cause aircraft to deviate from ideal paths and to consume more
resources. Good solutions to conﬂict resolution should meet
safety criteria while maintaining high levels of efﬁciency.
Because all aircraft are identical and cruise at the same
speed, and since conﬂict resolution maneuvers in our model
are constant-speed changes in heading, system efﬁciency can
be determined in our simulations from the time required by
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each aircraft to reach its destination. We deﬁne the individual
efﬁciency for aircraft i as
ti
(19)
Ei =
td i + ti
where ti is the ideal ﬂight time of the aircraft and td is the added
delay time it experienced. Then, the system efﬁciency is given
by
N
1 
E=
Ei
N i= 1

(20)

where N is the number of aircraft in the system. In an ideal
scenario, all aircraft ﬂy their nominal direct-line paths, so E =
1. As trafﬁc density and congestion increase, aircraft deviate
further from their ideal paths, and E decreases in value.
C. Standard Deviation of Efﬁciency
The standard deviation of individual efﬁciencies (DE ) of the
aircraft in a system is proposed as a measure of fairness. If
the standard deviation is large, then, in order to avoid safety
violations, some aircraft have paths that are inefﬁcient relative
to those of other aircraft. DE is given by

N
1 
DE = 
(Ei − E)2 .
(21)
N i= 1
In the ideal system (where E = 1), the added delay of each
aircraft is zero, so DE = 0. As congestion and added delay
increase, DE increases unless the fractional increases in path
length experienced by all aircraft are identical. While DE gives
some insight into the operation of the system for a particular
conﬂict resolution algorithm, it is of secondary importance relative to E. In an inefﬁcient system, it is of little consolation that
delays are spread fairly across all participants.
D. System Stability
System stability (S) is a measure of the extent to which conﬂict resolution maneuvers create new conﬂicts that, in turn, will
require additional resolution maneuvers [12]. Let A1 represent
the set of conﬂict alerts arising if all aircraft were to ﬂy their
nominal straight-line paths. A conﬂict alert is a projected separation violation between two aircraft if both were to continue
on their present heading. A conﬂict alert can occur only if the
aircraft involved are within each other’s viewable range, and
each projected incident counts as a single alert. If A2 is the set
of conﬂict alerts arising when conﬂict resolution maneuvers are
employed, then S is given by
|A1 |
.
(22)
S=
|A2 |
For example, if S has the value 0.5, then the conﬂict resolution
algorithm caused a doubling in the number of conﬂicts that had
to be considered relative to ﬂying the nominal straight-line path.
VII. RESULTS
Our simulation environment is similar to that used in other
studies [12], [21], [22]. All aircraft are constrained to ﬂy at the
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same altitude and at a constant speed of 500 mph. Small, instantaneous heading changes are the sole means of resolving conﬂicts. At each 1 s time step, each aircraft chooses one of its ﬁve
directional options based on information it has received from aircraft within 50 nmi. After an option has been selected, all aircraft
update their headings and positions, the new information is distributed to all adjacent aircraft, and the display screen is updated.
While certain patterns of conﬂicting aircraft might be common occurrences in any ATC system, it is impossible to enumerate all possible interaction geometries. For this reason, conﬂict
resolution algorithms should be evaluated across a wide range
of cases. Our studies include scenarios with both ﬁxed geometries and random trafﬁc patterns. We note that some simulated
situations have high trafﬁc densities that exceed the capabilities
of any known solution technique, including our own. While they
are highly unlikely to occur in actual air trafﬁc, these scenarios
were included in our study to allow comparison of our results
with previous studies employing the same trafﬁc patterns. Moreover, these cases give valuable insight into the capabilities and
limitations of any conﬂict resolution scheme.
A. Random Flights
Based on a model used in [12], this scenario uses two concentric circles in open air space. Aircraft appear at random points on
the outer circle (radius 120 nmi) and are assigned a random destination point on the inner circle (radius 100 nmi). The 20-nmi
buffer between the circles decreases the probability of generating an aircraft initially in conﬂict with another aircraft. Because
this scenario creates and tests a wide range of conﬂicts with varying geometries, it is a good test of conﬂict resolution algorithms.
Each simulation run has an associated trafﬁc density,
measured in aircraft per 10 000 nmi2 . Simulated densities range
from 1 to 25 per 10 000 nmi2 . (For comparison, peak trafﬁc
densities in U.S. airspace are typically between 1 and 5 aircraft
per 10 000 nmi2 [12].) As each simulation run begins, new
aircraft are generated at approximately 5-s intervals until the
target density is achieved, after which new aircraft are generated
only to replace those that arrive at their destinations. Statistics
are collected only during a 50-min interval that begins once the
target density is reached. Reported results are averaged over 20
simulation runs at each density. For comparison, we include results reported in [12] for their centralized scheme and their best
performing decentralized algorithm—the look-ahead approach.
Fig. 3 conﬁrms that the efﬁciency of conﬂict resolution
algorithms generally declines as the trafﬁc density increases.
Among decentralized schemes, the satisﬁcing approaches
offer signiﬁcantly better performance. Surprisingly, there is
little difference in the system efﬁciency of the two satisﬁcing
schemes. Their performance relative to the centralized scheme
is particularly noteworthy, given that a central controller can
consider the entire airspace.
Even at the highest trafﬁc densities, aircraft experience little
added delay on average. In our simulations, the average ﬂight
length was approximately 163 nmi. At 500 mph, with a system
efﬁciency of 97%, the average ﬂight takes just 37 s longer than
the ideal ﬂight time. However, a change in system efﬁciency as
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Average system efﬁciency.

Fig. 5.

Average system stability.
TABLE I
AVERAGE SAFETY RESULTS FOR RANDOM SCENARIO

Fig. 4.

Standard deviation of system efﬁciency.

small as 0.01 is considered signiﬁcant, since it results directly
in a comparable reduction in operating costs [12].
While the satisﬁcing schemes exhibit impressive performance
in terms of system efﬁciency, how evenly do they distribute the
added delay as the density increases? The bottom two curves
in Fig. 4 show that the standard deviation of system efﬁciency
for our two algorithms grows smoothly as the trafﬁc density
increases. (No comparable numbers are available that describe
other published schemes; the other two curves in the picture will
be explained shortly.) Many aircraft ﬂy near optimal ﬂight paths,
but as trafﬁc density increases, more aircraft must participate in
conﬂict resolution maneuvers that also increase in complexity.
Fig. 5 summarizes measurements of system stability. Because
of its global perspective, the centralized approach is better than
any decentralized scheme at avoiding resolution maneuvers that
cause future conﬂict alerts. The system stability of the satisﬁcing
approaches is far better than the decentralized look-ahead algorithm. The satisﬁcing algorithms are able to resolve multiple
conﬂicts in a single maneuver, whereas the look-ahead scheme
resolves conﬂicts pairwise and sequentially. Moreover, the satisﬁcing approaches make effective use of the knowledge of the
intended destinations of other aircraft, resulting in cooperative
solutions that are effective in resolving conﬂicts.

By the metrics represented in the ﬁgures, the simpliﬁed
model outperforms the full model by a small margin, but this is
not the full picture. As the trafﬁc density increases, separation
violations occur more frequently using the simpliﬁed model, as
shown in Table I. The full model is more effective in avoiding
separation violations, but this results in an increase in avoidance
maneuvers and a corresponding decrease in system efﬁciency
and system stability.
To further explore the capabilities of the satisﬁcing algorithms, we investigated the effects of including aircraft that
do not follow behavioral conventions. Consider the noncompliant aircraft described in Section IV that transmit the same
information as other aircraft, but always ﬂy directly to their
destinations regardless of their rankings. As previously noted,
satisﬁcing algorithms offer a straightforward way of dealing
with noncompliant aircraft: other aircraft move them to the top
of their rankings after observing their failure to defer to others.
When noncompliant aircraft are included in the random
ﬂight scenario, the overall system efﬁciency is reduced. The
noncompliant aircraft themselves have perfect individual
efﬁciencies, but conforming aircraft are forced to make more
detours, and conﬂicts are resolved without the full cooperation
of all participants. The top two curves in Fig. 4 show the
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TABLE II
RESULTS FOR THE CHOKE POINT SCENARIO

standard deviation of system efﬁciency for the two satisﬁcing
schemes when 10% of the aircraft are noncompliant. As
trafﬁc density increases, an increasing number of aircraft must
make signiﬁcant detours to avoid conﬂicts since the resolution
of many conﬂicts is now unilateral and noncooperative. As
expected, the system with noncompliant aircraft is markedly
less fair than when all aircraft conform.
Table I summarizes the average number of collisions and
near misses occurring during the 50-min simulation intervals
as the aircraft density (per 10 000 nmi2 ) increases. Results are
shown for both full and simpliﬁed models, both with and without
noncompliant aircraft. (Collisions and near misses were not
reported in [12], so comparison with their approaches is not
possible.) The results suggest that situations arise occasionally
in the random ﬂight scenario that are difﬁcult to resolve. The
frequency of separation violations increases as the trafﬁc density
increases, and it also increases when noncompliant aircraft are
added to the system.

Fig. 6.

Choke point snapshots with 10-nmi grid.

Fig. 7.

Perpendicular ﬂows with 25-nmi grid.

B. Choke Point
In this scenario, based on a model used in [26], all aircraft
begin from evenly spaced points on a circle with radius 50 nmi.
Each aircraft’s destination is the point on the circle directly
opposite its starting point, so all ideal paths coincide at the
center of the circle. Although not representative of actual trafﬁc
patterns, this scenario presents a considerable challenge for any
conﬂict resolution algorithm, both in terms of cooperatively
resolving simultaneous multiway conﬂicts and in completing
all required computation in real time. In the full satisﬁcing
model, inﬂuence ﬂows must consider all aircraft, and the
resulting computation cannot run in real time. We present
results only for the simpliﬁed model.
Table II summarizes simulation results as the number of aircraft is varied. (Each result is from a single run; neither the
scenario nor the algorithm include random aspects, so multiple
runs with a given number of aircraft give identical results.) The
number of near misses increases as the number of aircraft is increased, but there are no collisions. Because the circle is of ﬁxed
size, an increase in the number of aircraft causes a corresponding
increase in trafﬁc density. As the density increases, the satisﬁcing algorithm exhibits a graceful degradation in efﬁciency.
The pattern of the solution that emerges is particularly noteworthy. Fig. 6 shows four interim snapshots for a run with 32

aircraft. Although the algorithm is in no way preprogrammed to
handle this speciﬁc situation, the solution is essentially that of
a multilayered roundabout, a solution technique suggested and
evaluated by other researchers [13], [15], [16], [19], [26].
C. Perpendicular Flows
In this scenario, introduced in [21], two linear trafﬁc ﬂows
intersect at right angles, one moving left to right and the second moving from top to bottom. Fig. 7 shows a sequence
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TABLE III
RESULTS FOR PERPENDICULAR FLOW SCENARIO

of four screen snapshots from one simulation run. In a given
ﬂow, all aircraft are generated at the same point (slightly offscreen in the ﬁgure) with the same destination. As the ﬂows
approach the intersection point, the aircraft position themselves
to avoid violations of the 5-nmi separation distance. For this
scenario, aircraft are aware of all other aircraft within 100 nmi.
At the default rate, aircraft are generated 40 s apart, creating
a separation from the previous aircraft of about 5.5 nmi. Each
aircraft can thus perform avoidance maneuvers without violating its safety margin with the aircraft immediately behind
it.
Table III reports simulation results of the simpliﬁed model
for the perpendicular ﬂows scenario. Occasional gaps are inserted that are approximately the size of the safety zone around
a single aircraft. The distribution column in the table describes
the average number of aircraft in a consecutive string before a
gap is introduced. The string length is a uniform random variable with distribution U (μ/2, 3μ/2) for the values of μ shown.
(The row marked constant ﬂow includes no gaps.) Gap sizes in
the vertical and horizontal ﬂows are 75 and 80 s, respectively.
The difference shifts the relative alignment of aircraft in the
ﬂows over time, creating different intersection geometries. The
table reports the total number of ﬂights completed, as well as
the number of safety violations of each type. The results are
averaged over ten different simulation runs, each modeling a
24-h period. The results show that safety and efﬁciency metrics show steady improvement as the frequency of inserted gaps
increases.
Although the satisﬁcing algorithm is not preprogrammed to
handle this speciﬁc scenario, the solution that emerges (as depicted in Fig. 7) exhibits the same wave-like patterns as the
solution presented in [21].
D. Computational Load
An important concern in any real-time implementation is
computational load. Our custom simulator, written entirely in
Java, employs a central thread to model the shared airspace
with separate threads for the decision support system or agent
onboard each aircraft. Communication between the simulator
and each agent thread takes place via explicit message objects.
In our simulations, we used a single Pentium IV processor to
control all aircraft in all simulations, with up to 80 aircraft
modeled simultaneously.
Of the two satisﬁcing models, the full model is the more
computationally demanding. For an n-agent system where each

agent has k options, the time required for the computation of
the full model is at worst O(nk n ). The number of computations
required depends on the number of conﬂicting aircraft within
50 nmi. For a large number of conﬂicting aircraft (as in the
choke point scenario), this becomes difﬁcult to complete in
real time. This was our main motivation for developing the
simpliﬁed algorithm that runs in constant time for each aircraft
regardless of the number of conﬂicting aircraft. Of course, in
an actual implementation, the decision code for each individual
aircraft would run on its own dedicated computing resources,
rather than sharing resources with all aircraft in the system as
occurs in our simulator.
VIII. CONCLUSION
The need for new algorithms that automate decision making
will continue to grow as air trafﬁc densities increase. Satisﬁcing decision theory offers an attractive method of modeling and
solving distributed multiagent problems that are inherently cooperative as in the case of ATC. Satisﬁcing theory is mathematically sound, robust, and ﬂexible. Solutions based on satisﬁcing
theory can exhibit complex behavior, yet are based on relatively
simple algorithms that are not speciﬁc to any ﬁxed problem scenario. While many envisioned extensions to satisﬁcing theory
remain to be explored, our results suggest that a satisﬁcingbased approach can offer good performance and safety for the
challenging problem of resolving conﬂicts between aircraft in
a decentralized ATC system. In particular, our satisﬁcing algorithms demonstrate emergent behavior that matches previous
solutions resulting from the analysis of special cases. This suggests that the rule set implemented within the satisﬁcing framework captures much of the essence of ideal conﬂict resolution
using constant-speed heading-change maneuvers.
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